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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
M. KENNETH WHITE, 
Plaintiff ttnd Appellant} 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Cor-
poration, 
Defendant and ReJpondent. 
Case No. 7652 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
FILED 
SEP 101951 
------------------------------·- .. -- ... --- __ , 
Clerk, Supreme Court, ·~LIAM D. CALLISTER and 
A. c~. MEL VILLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~f. KENNETH WHITE, 
Plaintiff and Ap pel/ant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a b{uniciptl Cor-
poration, "' 
Case No. 7652 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Comes now Appellant and herewith submits his Reply 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
Ownership of property abutting both sides of a street in-
cludes ownership of the street itself, subject only to the use 
of the same by the public for highway purposes. 
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POINT II 
The unauthorized laying of a "\Vater pipe line by a munici-
pality in a street outside of its corporate limits, which line in 
no way benefits or serves the abutting property, is an additional 
burden upon the property, constituting an invasion of the 
abutting owner's rights, and is actionable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY ABUTTING BOTH 
SIDES OF A STREET INCLUDES OW1~ERSHIP OF THE 
STREET ITSELF, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE lJSE OF THE 
SAME FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES. 
Respondent in its answer brief, cites several cases from 
other jurisdictions holding that municipalities own the fee 
interest in streets and highways. These cases have no bearing 
upon the point under discussion. Here, we are only concerned 
'vith the Utah Statutes bearing upon the subject and our own 
Supreme· Court decisions construing them. 
From Sections 36-1-1 and 36-1-7, U. C. A. 1943, it is 
very clear that the public has an easement in streets and high-
ways, and that the abutting owner has the fee title. However, 
on the surface, there is an apparent inconsistency with Section 
78-5-4, U. C. A. 1943, relied upon heavily by Respondent, \vhich 
pr.ovides that the fee to the street passes when a plat of a 
subdivision is recorded. But the case of Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake 
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County, 104 Pac. 111, cited in Appellanfs original Brief, re-
solves this apparent inconsistency. This case was dealing with 
the abandonment of a street, and the argument of the County 
was that inasmuch as the qfee" passed by virtue of Laws of 
1890, P. 76, C. 50, the forerunner of Section 78-5-4, U. C. A. 
1943, abandonment of the interest in the public could not result 
by non-use of the street. It was in ansv..rer to this argument that 
our Supreme Court held that the fee to the corpus or the land 
did not pass, but only the fee to the surface for public use 
as a street or highway. Please also see Hall v. North Ogden 
City, 175 P.(2) 703, at Page 713. 
The case of Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 Pac. 959, cited in 
Respondent's brief, was an action brought as an outgrowth of 
the other Sowadzki case. But this case confirms the doctrine of 
the other Sowadzki case, by holding that only an easement in 
the street is created in the public by the recording of a platted 
subdivision. · 
To rebut Appellant's contention, Respondent cites Section 
36-;~-3, U. C. A. 1943 which provides for the ((Regulation of 
Water and Water Mains, etc.", which is part of Chapter 3, 
tcDivision and Use of High\vay .Space." Respondent contends 
this enlarges the right of the public in the highway. This sec-
tion is not designed to describe or enlarge upon the rights 
of the public in h~ghway space as set forth in Section 36-1-7, 
U. C. A. 1943, but is solely for the purpose of giving control 
of the highway, such as it is, to the county commission. 
Please see Dailey vs. State (Ohio), 3 7 N. E. 710, wherein 
the court said: 
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t(The legislature may authorize the construction of 
a telegraph line by a telegraph company upon a public 
highway, in such a manner as not to incommode the 
public in the _use of such highway; but authority so given 
does not empower such company to injure the property 
of an adjoining landowner, nor to appropriate any of 
his property rights in the highway, except upon condi-
tion that compensation be first made; ... " 
So, in the case at bar, the necessity of securing permission 
-of the county commission to lay water mains, etc., does not 
carry with it the right to appropriate the property right of the 
abutting owner in the highway itself. 
Thus, to summarize: The cases from other jurisdictions 
do not determine the extent of the public's right in a street or 
highway in our state. Such rights must be determined by our 
own statutes and Supreme Court decisions construing them. 
Our statutes and decisions definitley establish that the fee is 
in the abutting owner' with an easement in the public for high-
way purposes. To hold other~vise would be to ignore our own 
statutes and to overturn the decision of the Sowadzki case, supra. 
POINT II 
THE UNAUTHORIZED LA YI!'JG OF A WATER PIPE 
LINE BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A STREET OlJTSIDE OF 
ITS CORPORATE LIMITS, WHICH LINE IN NO WAY 
BENEFITS OR SERVES THE ABUTTING PROPERTY, IS 
AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN UPON THE PROPERTY, 
CONSTITUTING _AN INVASION OF THE i\BlJTTING 
OWNER'S RIGHTS, AND IS ACTIONABLE. 
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In ans\vering Point II of Appellant's brief, Respondent 
on page 27 of its brief, suggests that the Hofius v. Carnegie-
Illinois Steel Co. case, 67 NE ( 2) 429, relied upon by Appel-
lant, should be construed 'vith t\vo other Ohio cases, Smith v. 
Central Power Company, 103 Ohio 681, 137 NE 159, and 
State v. Board of Commissioners of Summit County, 175 
NE 590. The latter case held that the county could lay water 
lines in a county road where it was for the benefit of the 
abutting as \Yell as other owners. But the Ifofius case, decided 
in 1946, \vhich 'vas much later, specifically overruled that 
particular part of the opinion in the Board of Commissioners 
of Summit County case. The Smith and Ho:fius cases estab-
lish that in Ohio, the fee interest in city streets is in the muni-
cipality, but that in county roads, the fee is in the abutting 
owner, with an easement in the public for highway purposes. 
However, the Hofius case goes further, as pointed out in Ap-
pellant's original brief, and holds that a water n1ain over a 
county highway, solely for the benefit of a neighboring village, 
is an additional burden on the fee of the abutting owner. 
Inasmuch as our own Court, in the Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake 
County case, supra, held the fee to be in the abutting owner, 
with the public having an easement in the highway for highway 
purposes, the Hofius case from Ohio is squarely in point, and 
supports Appellant's Point II. 
Respondent cites three Kansas cases to the contrary. They 
hold that telephone, oil and gas lines constructed by public 
utilities in county highways are not additional burdens on the 
rights of the abutting O\vner. The earliest of these three, Mc-
Cann v. Johnson County 1"·elephone Company, 76 Pac. 870, 
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which was used as authority for the other two, was a three to 
two split decision. 
The Oklahoma case cited by Respondent, concerns an oil 
line, built by a public utility in a county highway. The 1\.finne-
sota case cited by Respondent, which used the McCann case, 
supra, as an authority dealt with a telephone line in a county 
road. It was also a three to two split decision. 
Respondent cites an Oregon case, dealing with an unin-
corporated part of a county, which became incorporated into a 
town. This Oregon case contains a quotation from Elliott on 
Roads and Streets, which particular quotation is set out in 
Respondent's brief, dealing with a street under circumstances. 
But in another part of Elliott's text, Third Edition, paragraph 
489, page 541, the particular point in the case at bar is dis-
cussed under the heading ']llustrative Cases-Pipes in a Coun-
try Road" as follows: 
~'In the Pennsylvania case (Sterling's Appeal, 2 Atl. 
105, which also was cited in Appellant's original brief) 
the court stated with clearness and precision the rights 
of the owner of the fee in a country road and said: ~In 
other words, the only servitude imposed on the land is 
the right of the public to construct and maintain thereon 
a safe and convenient roadway, which shall at all times 
be open and free for public use as a highway.' If this 
premise be granted, and it cannot well be denied, there 
would seem to be no doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion that laying gas or water pipes in a country 
highway is not a purpose legitimately connected with 
the use of the land as a way for public travel ... " 
-Two of the cases cited by Respondent under its Point III 
contain references to McQuillin on 1\funicipal Corporations, 
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presumably in support of Respondent's position. However, in 
Volume 3 of ~lcQuillin, paragraph 1344, page 2901, there 
is footnote No. 96, which refers to Baltimore County Water 
& Electric Co.'v. Dubreuil, 105 Md. 424, 66 Atl. 439. At page 
440, the court in this case said: 
((But the great weight of authority is to the effect that 
there is a distinction between the use of streets in cities 
and tOWnS for gas and \Vater pipes and the USe of COUn-
try or rural highways. See 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 
921, 30 lb. 438, 15 CYC. 671, lb. 683, 2 Abbott on 
Mun. Cor. 1166, and -Thorton on Oil and Gas, para. 
505, where_ many cases v.rill be found in the notes. In 
Mackenzie's case, 74 ,l\1d. 47, 21 Atl. 690, 28 Am. St. 
Rep. 219, the distinction is recognized and reasons given 
for it. In that case it v.ras said of tan ordinary road or 
highway in the country' that tall the public acquires is 
the easement of passage and its incidents,' and that is 
in substance the doctrine announced by most courts.'' 
Thus, Elliott and 1fcQuillin, together with Tiff any and 
the cases cited in Appellant's original brief all support Appel-
lant's position that the laying of the water main in j:he streets 
located in the County, as set forth in the Complaint filed in 
the instant case, is an additional burden on the abutting fee. 
This represents the majority view. The few cases cited by Re-
spondent represent a minority view.' 
However, we must consider Respondent's cases further, 
for there is a distinction benveen them and the case at bar. 
The cases cited by Respondent dealing with the laying of gas, 
oil and telephone lines in_ country roads all concern public 
carriers and public utilities. Each case included in its discus-
9-
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sion the public nature of the use and the fact that a public 
utility was concerned. 
But what about the instant case? Respof\dent is not a 
public utility. When it placed the water main in the streets 
·described in the complaint, it \vas doing so solely for the use 
and benefit of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City. The abutting 
owner had no right to connect on to the line. Thus, Respondent 
actually appropriated a portion of the subsurface of the street 
solely for a certain group of people, which is not a public, but 
a private use. 
Therefore, not even the minority view that country roads 
may be used by public utilities and carriers without further 
burdening the fee, applies. 
Under Point III of Respondent's brief, numerous cases 
are cited to support the proposition that although an abutting 
owner owns to the center of the street, there is no right to dam-
ages for the laying of lines in the street. Each case refers to the 
laying of lines in city streets, \vhich is not our problem. Thus, 
not one of them is in point. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, only two conclusions can logically 
be reached. 
First, the Appellant owns the fee to the streets in ques-
tion, subject to the right of the public to use the same f~Jr 
highway purposes. 
10 
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Second, in view of such authorities as Tiffany, Elliott, ~1c­
Quillin, and the numerous cases cited, all of which deal squarely 
with the point involved in this case, Respondent had no right 
to lay the water main in the streets abutting Appellan~' s prop-
erty, and in doing so is liable for the damage sustained. 
Thus, Appellant respectfully urges that this Honorable 
Court reverse the judgment of the District' Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER and 
A. C. MEL VILLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
, 
11 
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